

Driver Turnover Is Not Inevitable

What the Research Shows About Keeping Drivers, and Not Losing the Ones Who Apply

Professional Human Resources | ProHRHQ

Evidence reviewed through August 8, 2026

This paper synthesizes roughly 20 studies and industry datasets on driver recruiting and retention. It reads the evidence in a specific order of reliability: peer-reviewed and government research first, large industry datasets used descriptively second, and no argument built on individual carriers, job postings, or driver-forum comments. The method note at the end states that hierarchy in full. Where a research finding turns into something a carrier can do, the paper says so plainly, and where it describes what Professional Human Resources' recruiting system does, that is identified as system capability, not as a research finding.

Two conclusions run through everything below.

First, a carrier needs a job worth taking and keeping. Recruiting cannot repair bad dispatch, unsafe equipment, poor home time, or inadequate earnings.

Second, once a carrier has a competitive job, it should not lose interested drivers to a slow, cumbersome recruiting process. A good job creates driver interest. Recruiting execution determines whether the carrier captures it.

Part I, Why Drivers Leave

1. The same occupation produces very different turnover

The National Academies' 2024 review of pay and working conditions in long-distance trucking reported historical annualized turnover by segment:

SEGMENT	HISTORICAL ANNUALIZED TURNOVER
Large long-distance truckload	92.7%
Smaller long-distance truckload	77.6%
Private fleets	~15%
LTL linehaul	11.8%

The measurement periods differ and the truckload series comes from a self-selected sample, so these are patterns rather than precise 2026 benchmarks. The pattern is the finding: the same CDL, the same interstates, the same freight to move, and turnover that ranges from roughly one driver in seven to nearly the whole roster in a year.

The LTL figure settles one common assumption. LTL linehaul is for-hire trucking, and its historical turnover has run far below long-haul truckload. The dividing line is not private fleet versus for-hire. Low turnover exists inside for-hire trucking. What differs is the structure of the job.

The same review separates two things that get mixed together: drivers leaving a carrier, and drivers leaving the occupation. Burks and Monaco's analysis of nationally representative labor data found that about 82% of for-hire drivers observed in one year were still for-hire drivers a year later. Most of the churn a carrier experiences is drivers moving to other driving jobs, not leaving trucking. Phares and Balthrop, using a larger labor-market dataset, found relative wages and conditions drive that movement, and that trucking competes with construction, warehousing, production, and other work, not only with other carriers.

A driver who leaves one carrier on Friday and starts at another two weeks later has not left trucking. He has left a job. The question is not why people won't drive trucks. It is why a driver would leave this job for another one.

2. WHAT A LOWER-TURNOVER JOB LOOKS LIKE

The National Private Truck Council's 2025 benchmarking survey gives a concrete picture of a lower-turnover system. Among private fleets it reported average heavy-duty driver compensation of \$91,081, benefits adding roughly one-third more to compensation cost, 8.7 years average driver tenure, 18.4% annual turnover, and \$12,313 reported cost per driver turnover event. NPTC's retention research describes these jobs in operating terms, not pay terms alone: stable freight, predictable workloads, preferred routes, more home time, management transparency, support systems, and long-term employment relationships. The National Academies describes long-distance truckload differently, with intense price competition, piece-rate pay, irregular schedules, uncertain home time, and unpaid or lightly paid waiting.

These are population statistics used descriptively, not proof that any one practice causes the gap. Their value is that they show what a lower-turnover job actually contains. It is not simply a higher-paying job. It is a better-delivered one.

Part II, The Job Is a System

3. *The advertised job and the delivered job*

A carrier makes an offer: a pay rate, home time, equipment, benefits. The offer is what appears in the ad, the recruiter's pitch, and the orientation packet. It is real on paper.

The operating system then determines what the driver actually receives, week after week. Freight, dispatch, routing, equipment, and appointment scheduling decide whether the advertised miles materialize, whether the home-time promise holds, and whether the paycheck matches the number that drew the driver in.

These are not the same job. A carrier can advertise a strong weekly figure, good home time, and good equipment, and still deliver something else if its freight network and dispatch routinely leave drivers sitting. The advertised job is the offer. The delivered job is what operations produce. Retention responds to the delivered job.

4. A FAILURE IN ONE PART TRAVELS THROUGH THE WHOLE SYSTEM

The research does not identify one retention variable that outweighs the rest. It identifies a set of conditions that drivers respond to together, and they cannot be analyzed separately because they interact. A serious weakness in one part propagates through the others.

Two common chains show the mechanism:

Poor dispatch → excessive waiting → fewer productive miles → lower pay → missed home time → the driver leaves.

Unreliable equipment → breakdown → lost miles → lower pay → missed appointment → detention → missed home time → the driver leaves.

Neither chain starts with pay, and both end in a paycheck the driver did not sign up for. This is why scoring pay, dispatch, detention, home time, and equipment as separate line items misreads the job. Excessive detention is not only an operations problem; it is simultaneously an earnings problem, an hours problem, a home-time problem, and a trust problem. A serious failure in one part can undermine the value of the rest.

This is the first conclusion of the paper. Recruiting cannot fix a job like that. A carrier that recruits hard into a delivered job drivers do not want to keep is paying to fill a seat it will have to fill again. Part V returns to what makes the underlying job competitive. But a carrier that already has a competitive job faces a second, separate problem.

Part III, A Good Job Can Still Lose the Applicant

5. Interest is perishable

A competitive job creates driver interest. That interest does not last. A qualified driver comparing carriers is applying to several at once, deciding in days, and moving on quickly from any process that stalls or frustrates him.

Speed. Tenstreet's 2025 analysis, drawn from anonymized platform data across thousands of carriers and more than 1.5 million drivers through the first quarter of 2025, reported a 6.2% hiring rate among carriers responding to applications within five minutes, against a 3.7% platform average, and hiring rates falling by up to 50% when the hiring cycle extended beyond the platform's typical 10-to-15-day range. These are operational associations from a

single vendor's platform, not controlled experiments, and fast-response carriers may differ in other ways. The mechanism is still plain: a qualified driver with several applications out begins a relationship with whichever recruiter responds first.

Friction. A driver application asks for a lot of information: employment history, license details, accident and violation records, and other FMCSA-related data. A driver on a phone asked to retype a license number, ten years of employment history, and accident details a system could already have will often stop. Tenstreet reports pre-populated applications complete at materially higher rates than sessions that require re-entry. The direction is what matters, and it is not surprising.

Accuracy. Aryal and colleagues identified the gap between expected and actual work as a reason drivers leave. Realistic-job-preview research, including meta-analytic work, finds that accurate information produces accurate expectations, supports self-selection, and is associated with lower later turnover. A driver who declines after learning the real home-time pattern is a successful outcome. A driver who accepts because the pattern was concealed and quits three weeks later is a failure moved downstream at higher cost.

This is the bridge between the two conclusions:

Speed protects interest the job has already earned. Friction discards it.

The job creates the interest. Recruiting execution decides whether the carrier keeps it.

Part IV, What a Modern Driver Recruiting System Should Do

6. From interest to a completed application

Once a driver raises his hand, a working recruiting system should be able to do the following.

1. **Respond immediately with something useful**, confirmation the application arrived, accurate information about the actual job applied for, and a clear next step, not a generic receipt promising a call later.
2. **Give the recruiter room to follow up personally**, the immediate automated response buys time for the human call; it does not replace it.
3. **Begin the application with information already received**, a driver who arrived through a job board, a resume, a prior application, or recruiter intake should not start from a blank form.
4. **Enrich carrier and USDOT employment history**, motor-carrier work history can be identified from carrier records and USDOT information rather than typed out by driver and recruiter.
5. **Prefill and let the driver review rather than retype**, known information is presented for correction and completion, not re-entered.

6. **Offer a low-friction return path**, a driver who started an application resumes it through a secure magic link rather than reconstructing a login.
7. **Keep one persistent applicant record**, stage, notes, communications, documents, and next action in one place instead of scattered across inbox, phone, and calendar.
8. **Schedule the next action**, a date and an owner, not "follow up later."
9. **Give recruiters accurate job information**, pay, home time, benefits, equipment, and requirements inside the record, so common questions are answered consistently.
10. **Record why applicants are lost**, "not hired" teaches nothing; the reason does.

7. WHAT DQ VAULT DOES

DQ Vault, ProHRHQ's driver application and applicant-tracking system, is built to run that workflow. It does not merely acknowledge an application. When a driver applies, DQ Vault uses the information the driver already supplied, together with ProHRHQ's carrier and USDOT database of 4.4 million FMCSA carrier records, to begin building the actual driver application immediately, including motor-carrier employment-history enrichment. The driver reviews, corrects, and completes what remains rather than starting from a blank form. If he is interrupted, he returns through a secure magic link. Everything stays in one persistent applicant record with communications, documents, scheduled follow-up, and loss-reason tracking attached.

The research establishes the problem: delay and repeated data entry lose interested drivers. DQ Vault is the response to it. (The database record count is a ProHRHQ system figure, current as of the date this paper is published, not a research finding.)

Part V, What Makes the Underlying Job Competitive

The recruiting system captures interest a good job has created. It cannot create the job. This part returns to what the research says makes a job worth keeping.

8. PAY LEVEL, PAY STABILITY, AND EFFECTIVE EARNINGS

Two natural experiments give this unusually direct evidence. Faulkner and Belzer found higher wages for experienced drivers improved retention at a large truckload carrier, with safety and productivity gains from the experience retained. Rodríguez, Targa, and Belzer earlier found a large wage increase reduced separation probability at a large OTR carrier. Pay level is a real retention lever.

Pay stability is a separate finding. Conroy and colleagues, using objective pay and turnover data, found that pay volatility, pay level, and pay trajectory each predicted voluntary turnover. Two drivers can earn the same annual

total while living very different jobs: one on dependable weekly checks, the other swinging between strong and weak weeks because of detention, inconsistent miles, deadhead, dispatch variability, and breakdowns.

A posted mileage rate is a promise about pay. What the driver banks is the product of that rate and the productive miles the operating system delivers, minus what unpaid and unstable time takes back. A carrier that wants to compare jobs honestly compares effective earnings, not the advertised rate:

$$\text{effective driver earnings} = \text{cash compensation} + \text{employer-paid benefits} + \text{paid non-driving time} + \text{other economic value} - \text{driver-paid job costs} - \text{value lost to unpaid or unstable work}$$

9. THE OPERATING JOB: DISPATCH, DETENTION, HOME TIME, EQUIPMENT

This is where the advertised job is delivered, or fails to be. Correll's 2024 analysis of three years of electronic-logging data from roughly 1,200 solo long-haul drivers found the quantity and consistency of weekday driving assignments supplied much of the predictive power for turnover. McKenzie and colleagues found route communication, preplanning, workload, pay satisfaction, time-off flexibility, and supervisor representation significant in a model of likelihood of staying. ATRI's 2024 detention research estimated drivers experienced roughly 117 to 209 detention hours per year depending on sector, and more than 135 million detention hours across for-hire trucking in 2023. Williams, Garver, and Taylor identified home time alongside pay and personal safety as major driver priorities; Aryal and colleagues connected home-time-limiting schedules with intention to leave.

Time a driver spends waiting, unpaid or lightly paid, is compensation the operating system failed to deliver, and it consumes his available hours and pushes back the home time he was promised. A home-time promise is worth only what operations honor. Equipment belongs here too, not on a features list: a truck that breaks down cuts miles, creates unpaid time, makes home-time commitments unreliable, and raises safety exposure, one failure moving through the same chain as poor dispatch.

10. DISPATCH AND MANAGEMENT DELIVER, OR DEGRADE, EVERYTHING ELSE

Dispatch and supervision are not a separate concern sitting apart from the economics. They control the chain that turns a rate into a paycheck: loads determine miles, planning determines waiting, routing determines productive hours, and home-time execution determines quality of life. Poor dispatch degrades the compensation package itself, because a driver cannot spend a mileage rate. He spends the check the delivered miles produce.

The research connects this to retention across several methods. Fournier, Lamontagne, and Gagnon documented the weight drivers place on listening and mutual respect from dispatch. Thomas, Liao-Troth, and Williams connected role conflict and ambiguity with burnout and identified organizational support as a buffer. Huang and colleagues surveyed 6,207 drivers at two carriers and followed them with objective turnover data a year later: more positive safety-climate perceptions were associated with higher satisfaction and lower subsequent turnover. Swartz and colleagues found perceived safety climate strongly related to job attitudes, which related strongly to intention to leave. Morrow and colleagues add the caution that no single management-relationship variable explains the

whole problem: drivers leave over pay, home time, assignments, freight, safety, family needs, better offers, and management, usually several at once. That is the systems finding again.

11. BENEFITS, EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE, AND THE W-2 SHORTHAND

Benefits are part of the competitive job, not a separate category. ATRI's survey of more than 2,000 professional drivers found company drivers ranked job security, income, healthcare, and retirement among their leading motivations, while owner-operators and independent contractors ranked independence, scheduling flexibility, and route choice highest.

"W-2" is often used as shorthand for the employee package that goes with it: health coverage, retirement, paid time off, workers' compensation, unemployment protection, employer payroll-tax participation, and less business and equipment risk carried by the driver. A real employee compensation and protection package is a strong reason a driver stays, provided the operating system around it delivers the job. The same package sitting on top of poor dispatch, inconsistent miles, or broken home-time promises does not hold, because the driver never receives the job the package was attached to. The package is a genuine part of a driver-worthy job, and it works when the rest of the system works.

An owner-operator or independent-contractor arrangement is a different economic product, not a worse one, and it suits a driver who runs an independent business. It should be compared with an employee job on net business income after expenses, not by placing an employee wage next to a contractor's gross settlement. Classification is a matter for each carrier and its advisors; a comparison of the two structures appears in the appendix.

Part VI, The Economics of Losing a Driver

12. The cost of a lost driver and an empty truck

The National Private Truck Council (NPTC) reported \$12,313 per driver turnover event in its 2025 benchmark. The categories behind any carrier's own number are recognizable: advertising and applicant acquisition, recruiter labor, screening and qualification, records work, orientation, onboarding, training, early-period lower productivity, and management time, plus another full cycle when the hire fails.

The loss from an unseated truck can belong in that turnover number too, depending on how the carrier defines it. When a tractor sits because a driver left, some variable costs stop, but fixed costs continue: the payment or lease, depreciation, insurance, permits, overhead. The carrier also gives up the contribution the truck would have produced above its variable operating costs. ATRI's 2026 Analysis of the Operational Costs of Trucking reported an industry-average operating cost of \$2.336 per mile in 2025, with carriers cutting truck counts and additional trucks sitting unseated amid weak freight economics. Whether the unseated-equipment loss is already inside a published turnover figure or sits outside it varies by source, so a carrier building its own number counts it once, in whichever place it tracks it. A benchmark like the \$12,313 is a recruiting-and-replacement figure and generally does

not include the fixed-cost and lost-contribution drag of the empty seat, which is why a carrier's true cost is often higher than the benchmark alone suggests.

Two cautions keep the number honest. First, in a weak market a carrier may reasonably decline to seat a truck whose available freight will not clear an acceptable return, so the lost contribution counts only for a vacancy the carrier would otherwise have filled profitably. Second, the fixed-cost-and-contribution component belongs in one place, whether inside the turnover figure or beside it, and is not counted twice.

total cost of a lost driver = turnover cost (recruiting, replacement, and lost early productivity) + unseated-equipment cost (continuing fixed cost + foregone contribution during a vacancy the carrier would have filled profitably)

The two lines above must not overlap. If a carrier's turnover figure already includes any equipment drag, it does not get added again in the second term.

Four numbers turn retention from a cultural discussion into an operating decision: the cost to produce one seated, qualified driver; the cost of one early failed hire; average vacancy days per tractor; and the contribution margin lost during a profitable vacancy.

Part VII, Measuring the Whole System

13. From first interest through retention

A carrier can generate large applicant counts and still fail, because the count measures the top of the funnel and says nothing about the delivered job underneath it. The useful measurement runs from first qualified interest through retention:

qualified lead → application → recruiter contact → qualification → orientation scheduled → orientation attended → seated driver → 30-day retained → 90-day retained → 180-day retained

At each stage: how many enter, how many advance, time to the next step, the reason for loss, and cost accumulated so far.

METRIC	QUESTION IT ANSWERS
Application completion rate	How many qualified applicants finish enough to be worked?
Median response time	How long until useful acknowledgment?
Median human-contact time	How long until a recruiter reaches the driver?

METRIC	QUESTION IT ANSWERS
Qualification cycle time	How long from application to decision?
Orientation show rate	How many scheduled candidates attend?
Seat rate	How many qualified applicants become active drivers?
30/90/180-day retention	How many hires remain past the early-failure window?
Cost per seated driver	Full acquisition cost ÷ seated drivers
Cost per 90-day retained driver	The same economics ÷ drivers still there after the early-failure window
Vacancy days per tractor	How long profitable equipment sits unseated
Economic vacancy cost	Continuing fixed cost + foregone contribution during a profitable vacancy

Recording the reason for each loss is what separates the problems a carrier can have. The useful categories name the failure: unqualified, pay mismatch, home-time mismatch, equipment concern, competing offer, slow process, application abandoned, could not contact, failed verification, orientation no-show, accepted then withdrew, early exit after seating. Losses to the job, losses to the process, and losses to qualification call for different fixes. A slow response is fixed with process. A delivered job that does not match the advertised one is not.

The most useful single number is cost per 90-day retained driver. A cheap lead that never completes an application is not cheap. A hire who quits in three weeks is not a successful hire because the seat was filled once. For a carrier, vacancy days and economic vacancy cost often persuade harder than any funnel rate, because they attach the retention problem to the equipment that has to earn.

What the Evidence Supports

1. Very high turnover is not universal in trucking. Segment data show private fleets and LTL retaining drivers at materially different rates from long-haul truckload, and LTL shows low turnover exists inside for-hire trucking.
2. Much carrier turnover is movement between employers, not exit from the occupation.
3. Pay level matters. Natural experiments show wage increases improved retention.
4. Pay stability matters. Objective data show volatility predicts quits independent of level.
5. The delivered operating job matters. Assignment consistency, workload, detention, and home-time execution appear across ELD, survey, and interview evidence.
6. Management, dispatch treatment, and safety climate matter, across surveys, interviews, and objective turnover records.
7. Employment structure and benefits are central to the company-driver proposition.

8. Recruiting accuracy, speed, and low friction matter at the stage of moving a driver into the job.

Professional Human Resources' Interpretation

Studies are cautious because studies should be cautious. A carrier still has to act.

The combined evidence supports a plain reading, and it is the two conclusions this paper opened with. A carrier makes an offer, and its operating system delivers or fails to deliver that offer week after week. A strong offer on a weak operating system does not become a strong job, and no amount of recruiting converts a delivered job drivers leave into one they keep. That is the first problem, and it is solved in operations.

The second problem is separate. A carrier with a genuinely competitive job can still lose the drivers who apply to it, through slow response, a punishing application, or a promise the job does not match. That is solved in recruiting, and it is what DQ Vault is built to do: capture the interest a good job has already earned, and not waste it.

Advertising can make more drivers see the job. Recruiting can describe it truthfully, respond quickly, and make applying easy. Neither can deliver miles that dispatch does not plan, honor a home-time promise operations will not keep, or repair a truck that will not run. First build a job worth keeping. Then make sure the recruiting process does not throw away the drivers who want it.

Applying the Evidence

First, examine the delivered job. Not the advertised terms, but what a driver actually receives across a month.

Would an experienced driver choose it over realistic alternatives once he knows the real miles, the real home time, the real equipment uptime, and the real treatment by dispatch?

Second, examine recruiting execution. Once a qualified driver shows interest, is the carrier making it hard to say yes? Response time, application friction, recruiter follow-up, cycle time, loss reasons, orientation show rate, seating, and 30/90/180-day retention.

Third, run the economics. What the delivered job is worth to the driver, what the carrier pays under its employment model, what turnover costs, and what a profitable vacancy costs while equipment sits. The carrier's own numbers replace the slogans.

Fourth, fix what the evidence identifies. Some carriers will find an applicant-flow problem. Some will find a response-time problem. Some will find an abandoned-application problem. Some will find competitive posted pay with unstable delivered earnings. Some will find a home-time promise operations do not keep. Some will find dispatch or equipment failures no recruiting can offset. The remedy follows the evidence inside the carrier. A slow response is fixed with process. A delivered job that does not match the advertised one is fixed in operations.

Conclusion

Some trucking jobs keep drivers and some do not, and the difference is too large and too durable to write off as a feature of holding a CDL. The research does not point to one magic retention variable. It shows that drivers respond to a system, and that a serious failure in one part can make the whole job unacceptable.

The offer a carrier advertises and the job its operating system delivers are not always the same job, and retention responds to the delivered one. A carrier that wants to keep drivers examines whether the job it is actually delivering competes with the driver's alternatives, then asks whether, once a good driver is interested, it makes joining easy or hard. Those are different problems. The first is the job. The second is recruiting. The first has to be solved before the second is worth doing, and the second should not be allowed to waste the drivers the first has earned.

Appendix, Employee and Independent-Contractor Structures Compared

Both structures are real. A driver who owns his equipment and runs loads for several carriers or shippers is an independent business by any measure. The point worth a carrier's attention is that classification is meant to follow the actual working relationship, and the relationship is not always what the paperwork says. Where a carrier owns the truck, supplies the equipment, controls the work, and directs how the driver performs it day to day, the arrangement resembles employment regardless of the tax form on file. The legal tests for where that line falls vary by jurisdiction and are in flux; as of August 8, 2026, the U.S. Department of Labor has proposed replacing its 2024 independent-contractor rule with an economic-reality analysis, and state tests such as California's differ. Classification is a matter for each carrier and its advisors.

DIMENSION	EMPLOYEE JOB	OWNER-OPERATOR / INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
Primary proposition	Stable employment and total compensation	Independent business
Cash measure	Wages, hourly, or mileage pay	Gross settlement / revenue
Benefits	May be employer-provided	Generally self-funded
Business and equipment risk	More borne by employer	More borne by the driver's business
Control	Employer-managed work	The driver's own business decisions
Honest comparison	Total compensation	Net business income after expenses

Evidence Base

SOURCE	PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTION
National Academies, 2024, <i>Pay and Working Conditions in the Long-Distance Truck and Bus Industries</i>	Segment turnover differences; long-haul work structure; carrier vs. occupational turnover
NPTC 2025 Benchmarking Survey	Private-fleet compensation, benefits, tenure, turnover, turnover cost (descriptive)
NPTC, <i>Why Drivers Stay</i>	Private-fleet job characteristics and retention practices (descriptive)
Burks & Monaco, 2019, <i>BLS Monthly Labor Review</i>	Occupational mobility, earnings, alternative labor markets
Phares & Balthrop, 2022, <i>Journal of Business Logistics</i>	Relative wages, occupational alternatives, nonproductive time
Miller, Bolumole & Muir, 2021, <i>Journal of Business Logistics</i>	Economic-cycle effects on truckload turnover
Conroy, Roumpi, Delery & Gupta, 2022, <i>Journal of Management</i>	Pay level, volatility, and trajectory vs. voluntary turnover
Faulkner & Belzer, 2019	Compensation natural experiment; value of retained experience
Rodríguez, Targa & Belzer, 2006	Wage increase and separation probability at a large OTR carrier
McKenzie et al., 2018	Routing, workload, pay satisfaction, flexibility, supervision
Correll, 2024, <i>Expert Systems with Applications</i>	ELD work patterns and turnover prediction
Williams, Garver & Taylor, 2011	Pay, personal safety, home time; driver need segments
Huang et al., 2016	Safety climate and objective turnover (6,207 drivers)
Swartz et al., 2017	Safety climate, job attitudes, intention to leave
Fournier, Lamontagne & Gagnon	Driver-dispatcher communication and mutual respect
Morrow et al., 2005	Management relationship and objective turnover; single-factor caution
Thomas, Liao-Troth & Williams, 2020	Role conflict, burnout, organizational support
Aryal et al., 2023	Expectation mismatch, benefits, home time, support

SOURCE	PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTION
Prockl et al., 2017	Financial and nonfinancial job properties and retention proneness
ATRI, 2021, owner-operator/IC research	Company-driver vs. owner-operator/IC preference profiles (2,000+ drivers)
ATRI, 2024, detention research	Detention hours, nonproductive time, pay, productivity
ATRI, 2026, <i>Analysis of the Operational Costs of Trucking</i>	2025 operating-cost context (descriptive)
Tenstreet UConnect25 platform analysis, 2025	Response-speed and hiring-cycle associations; application pre-population (operational, vendor-sourced)
Burks et al., 2015, <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>	Employee referrals: hiring, acceptance, retention
Realistic-job-preview meta-analytic research	Expectation accuracy, self-selection, turnover

Method note. The evidence base mixes peer-reviewed research, government and National Academies synthesis, nonprofit industry research, and vendor operational data, weighted unequally and read in that order of reliability. Objective labor-market, turnover, ELD, and safety studies carry the weight for behavioral conclusions. Industry benchmarks (NPTC, ATRI) are used for descriptive statistics, not causal claims. Vendor platform data (Tenstreet) are treated as operational associations, not experiments. Individual carriers, job postings, and driver-forum comments are not used as evidence: they invite arguments about whether a particular terminal, dispatcher, or posting is representative, and they cannot establish cause. Product notes describing the ProHRHQ applicant-tracking system are identified as system capability, not as research findings. No single source proves the thesis. The thesis is the interpretation of a consistent pattern across multiple kinds of evidence.

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